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Such interchange of assistance between officers of a bank, as temporary need may
require, is fairly within the contemplation of the appointment of such an officer,
and the sureties on his bond are liable for a default made while he was temporarily
filling the place of another officer.
The receiving teller of the savings department of a bank, while filling the place
of the general teller, during the latter's temporary absences, embezzled moneys of
the bank: Held, that the sureties on a bond, given by him for the faithful performance of his duties, were liable for the money so taken.

ERROR to the Superior Court of Detroit.
John H. Bissell and Otto Kirchner, for appellant.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-This suit is upon a bond given by defendant Herman H. Zeigler, as principal, etc., the other defendants as sureties,
to secure to the plaintiff the faithful performance of Zeigler's
duties as teller. The bond is dated February 10th 1877. The
penalty named is $5000, and the condition is as follows: "The
condition of this obligation is such, that whereas the above bounden
Herman H. Zeigler has been appointed receiving teller savings
department, and by the terms of the by-laws of said bank, is made
responsible for all such sums of money, property and funds of every
description, as may from time to time be placed in his hands Jy
the cashier, or otherwise come into his possession as receiving teller.
Now, therefore, the condition of the foregoing obligation is such
that if the said Herman H. Zeigler shall faithfully and honestly
discharge the duties of his said office, and shall faithfully apply
aad account for all such moneys, funds and valuables and shall
deliver the same, on proper demand, to the board of directors of
said bank, or to the person or persons authorized to receive the same,
then the foregoing obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in
full force and virtue."
At the time when this bond was given and Herman Zeigler
entered upon the performance of his duties, his brother, Charles
Zeigler, was the general teller of the bank. As such he had charge
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of commercial deposits and payments, and was also the superior
of Herman Zeigler, whose duty it was to account to him at the close
of each business day for the money received in the savings department for that day. It seems to have been customary in the bank,
if for any reason the general teller was temporarily absent, for the
receiving teller of the savings department to take his place while
his absence continued, and the cashier of the bank testified that be
directed this, and understood it to be the duty of the receiving
teller of the savings department to comply with the direction.
Such temporary absences occurred while Herman Zeigler was such
receiving teller, and he took his brother's place while they continued.
The case shows that of the moneys which came to his hands while
thus temporarily acting for his brother, he embezzled a sum larger
than the penalty of the bond. His brother was privy to the embezzlement.
1. This suit is in assumpsit; and it is objected that assurnpsit
will not lie. That at the common law the action must have been
debt, is conceded; but the statute provides that "in all cases arising upon contracts under seal, or upon judgments, when an action
of covenant or debt may be maintained, an action of assumpsit may
be brought and maintained in the same manner in all respects as
upon contracts without seal." Comp. Laws, sect. 6194. Counsel
for the defence make an ingenious argument to convince us that
this statute is not applicable to a penal bond without covenants.
We do not agree in this. We think the intent of the statute is
made plain in its words: to permit the action of assumpsit to be
brought "in all cases" where before an action of debt might be
brpught on a contract under seal. This is such a contract and such
a case.
2. The second objection to a recovery is more specious, and goes
to the merits. It is that there has been no breach of the bond. The
moneys for which Herman Zeigler failed to account did not, it is
said, come So his hands as receiving teller' of the savings department
of the bank, or in the performance of his duties as such; but they
came to his hands while he was temporarily performing the duties
of another office. But this bond is not cbnditioned that he shall
faithfully perform the duties of any other office, or account for
moneys that might come to his hands by virtue of any other trust;
and his sureties can not be supposed to have contemplated when
they undertook to be responsible for his conduct as receiving teller
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of the savings department, that they were making themselves
responsible for his conduct in some other position, to which he might
be assigned, and of which the duties might be different and the
responsibilities greater. This, in short, is the argument for the
defence.
Abstractly considered, this argument is undeniable. The sureties upon an official bond undertake for nothing which is not within
the letter of their contract. The obligation is stricti3simi Juris,;
and nothing is to be taken by construction against the obligors.
They have consented to be bound to a certain extent only, and their
liability must be found within the terms of that consent. Paw Paw
v. Eggleston, 25 Mich. 36, 40; -Detroitv. Leadbeater, 29 Id. 24;
Johnston v. Eiimball, 39 Id. 137; Bullocek v. Taylor, Id. 187;
United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; State v. Cutting, 2 Ohio
1; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Weonston v. State,
73 Ind. 175. This is familiar law, and rests. on sound reason.
But has this law any application to the facts of this case ? The
judge of the Superior Court thought it had, and turned the case
out of court. We are not satisfied he was correct in this.
The bank, it appears, was one which had two departments; a
savings department, and a commercial departmet. It had for both
one cashier and one general teller; and the money does not appear
to have been kept separate, but was brought daily into a common
fund. The receiving teller was subordinate to the general teller,
as well as to the cashier. The exact duties of the receiving teller
of the savings department do not seem to have been particularly
defined, except as the designation of the office would define them,
or as they would be indicated by the condition of the bond. He
was to be responsible for all such sums of money, property and
funds as the cashier might place in his hands as such teller, and
also for all such other money, property and funds as might otherwise
come into his hands as such teller. His duty was to account faithfully for all these. When the teller should stand at his desk and
receive savings deposits, he would of course receive them as receiving teller; and it might also be said that he would receive them
because they were placed in his hands by the cashier, who, as chief
financial officer of the bank, had placed him at that post. But
if the defence is correct in the view taken of this officer's duties,
it is not very manifest that the cashier could have bad any occasion
to intrust him with moneys otherwise. He simply received what
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was paid in, and handed it over to the general teller. What
occasion could have arisen for putting other moneys into his hands
as receiving teller merely ?
But we think this view is too restricted and narrow. -Everysuch
appointment is made with the general course of business in such
institutions in mind, and-it must contemplate that what is customary
will take place. If it is customary for one officer to assist another
when the need arises, we must assume that he expected to render
such assistance, and that by implication he undertook to do so as a
part of his official duty. And if he was bound to have this understanding of his undertaking and his duty, his sureties were bound
to have the like understanding. The number of officers of a bank
will vary with the extent of the business and with its needs. There
may be only a president and cashier, but there will commonly be a
teller, and there may also be a vice-president, assistant cashier, one
or more assistant tellers, and such number of book-keepers, messengers and other assistants as the business may require. When a
cashier and a teller are sufficient for all the ordinary needs of the
bank, is a cashier performing an official act when, in the temporary
absence of the teller, he steps to the teller's place and receives a
deposit ? Or is the teller acting outside his duty when, under corresponding circumstances, at the cashier's request, he answers the
ordinary calls at the cashier's table. We think not. We think
any such interchange of assistance as temporary need may require,
is fairly within the contemplation of any appointment to such a
place, of the undertaking in accepting it and of any official bond

that might be given by the appointee. If this were not so, every
officer in a bank would require an assistant, or the business of the
bank would come to a stop whenever temporary illness or any
necessity whatever should, for any time, however short, take him
from his desk. We agree entirely with the defence that it is not
legally competent to impose new duties upon an officer to the prejudice of his sureties, but we do not think such a temporary assignment is a case of that nature. The officer is merely giving the
temporary aid which must have been contemplated in his employment ;,'and if he were to refuse to give it when having no better
reason than that he did not consider it a part of his business, he
would have been likely to be regarded by his superiors as altogether
too unaccommodating for their purposes. It would not be too much
to expect a dismissal under such circumstances.
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We need not say whether a dismissal would be strictly justifiable,
for we do not think the needs of this case require a decision upon
that point. It is enough in this case to note that Herman Zeigler
did not refuse. As receiving teller of the savings department he
was called upon to take the place of the general teller temporarily,
and he took it and received moneys which be embezzled. The
moneys were confided to him by the cashier, because of his being
such receiving teller, and because in the opinion of the cashier,
which Zeigler himself did not contest, it was proper that he should
receive them under the circumstances. They therefore came to his
hands, because of his office and under circumstances justifying their
being confided to him as such. The cases of -fMinor v. M1fechanics'
Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Rochester aty Bank v. Blwood, 21 N. Y. 88;
and German-American Bank v. Auth, 87 Penn. St. 419, are in
point.
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial
ordered.
The other justices concurred.
I. Two cases of importance have been the funds of the bank. The question
decided recently upon the liability of
was, whether, according to the conditions
sureties on official bonds. One was of thi bond, the sureties were liable for
decided in the New York Court of Ap- the embezzlement thus committed. The"
peals, and is known as the National question was a nice one, and the conMechanics' Banking Association v.* Conk- clusion that they were not liable was
ling, reported in full in 15 Cent. reached, as the court declared, "not
Law J. 373, for Nov. 10th 1882. The without some hesitation and doubt."
other was decided in the Supreme Court We doubt not the case was correctly
of Michigan, and is the particular case decided, the reasoning of the court is
to which -this note is appended. The •satisfactory and convincing. The recital
two cases taken together are illustrative in such bonds undertaking to express the
of the two general classes under which precise intent of the parties, controls,
the cases may be arranged which relate said the court, the condition or obligation
to the liability of sureties on the official which foliows, and does not allow it any
bonds of private officers.
operation more extensive than the recital
1. In the National.lfechanics' Banking which is its key. London Assurance Co.
Association v. Conkling, supra, the facts v. Bold, 6 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 514;
were as follows. A bookkeeper in a Hassell v. Long, 2 K. & S. 363; Pearbank had given bond conditioned for the sall v. Summersett, 4 Taunton 593;
faithful discharge of his duties as such, Peppin v. Cooper, 2B.&A. 431"; Barker
"or the duties of any other office, trust v. Parker, 1 T. R. 287 ; Liverpool
or employment relating to the business Water Works Co. v. Atkinson, 6 East
of taid association which may be assigned 507; Tradesmens' Bank v. Woodw-ard,
to him." He was afterwards promoted Anthon's Nisi lrius R., 2d. ed. 300.
to the position of receiving teller, and ""rhis is a case where the general words
while acting in that capacity embezzled subsequently used must be controlled and
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limited by the recital. Asuretyis never
to be implicated beyond his specific
engagement, and his liability is always
strictissimijuris,and must not be extended
by construction." Consequently the sureties were not liable for a default committed after the appointment of their
principal to another position than that
of bookkeeper. They undertook for his
fidelity only while he was bookkeeper.
" But if, while bookkeeper, the duties
of any other office, trust or employment
relating to the business of the bank were
assigned to him, their obligation was
also to extend to the discharge of those
duties." The above case is, by reason
of the broad language of the condition
of the bond, a striking illustration of the
principle that the sureties on an official
bond are not liable for defaults committed
by their principal after his promotion to
a different position than that specified in
the bond. A principle of law about,
which there is no kind of doubt in ordinary cases. See, Manufacturers' Bank v.
Dickerson, 41 N. T. Law 449, where the
bond was conditioned for the performance
of the duties of an assistant clerk in a
bank, and the principal was promoted
to the position of bookkeeper, the sureties were held not liable for his default,
while holding the latter position.
2. The particular case, on the other
hand, represents another class of cases.
In that ease the bond was conditioned
for the faithful performance of the duties
of a receiving teller. The principal in
the bond was holding that office at the
time of the default, but was temporarily
acting as general teller, in the absence
of that officer, and while acting as such
was guilty of embezzlement. The bond
appears to have been loosely drawn.
Had it contained the condition which we
have seen was inserted in the bond in
National Mechanics' Banking Association
v. Conkling, supra, no question could
have arisen as to the liability of the
sureties. But notwithstanding the general character of the bond the sureties

were held liable, and there can be little
doubt but that the holding was correct.
In Rochester City Bank v. Blwood, 21
N. Y. 88, the bond was conditioned for
the faithful discharge of the trust reposed
in the principal as assistant bookkeeper.
The court held it to be an engagement
that he would not avail himself of his
position to misapply or embezzle the
funds of his employer, and that it was
immaterial that the embezzlement was
committed while the bookkeeper was
keeping a journal, which, when he
entered upon his duties, and usually,
was kept by the teller, and that fraudulent entries were made in such journal
to cover his default. In German-American
Bank v. Auth, 87 Penn. St. 419, the
question arose on the bond of a bank
messenger, conditioned that he should
conduct himself honestly and faithfully
as such messenger. The sureties were
held liable for money stolen byhim from
the bank, and it was held to be wholly
immaterial whether he was acting at the
time within the scope of his employment
as messenger or not. In Minor v.
Mlechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 -Peters
46, it'ivas held that the official bond of
a cashier of a bank must be construed to
cover all defaults in duty which might
be annexed to the office from time to time,
by those authorized to control the affairs
of the bank: that the sureties in the
bond were presumed to enter into their
contract with reference to the rights and
authorities of the president and directors
under the charter and by-laws. Opposed to these cases stands the solitary
case, so far as we have been able to
discover, of Allison r. Farmers' Bank,
6 Rand (Va.) 204. In that case it was
held, by a divided court, that the sureties were not liable for a felonious taking
of money by a bookkeeper, from the
drawer of a bank. The case was decided
upon the theory that the sureties did not
intend to bind themselves that their
principal should not commit a felony.
3. Intermediate between the two
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classes of cases abve considered comes
the recently decided case of the Home
Savings Bank v. Traube, 75 Mo. 199.
In that case it was held that the fact that
the bookkeeper of a bank performed the
duties of teller also, would not relieve
the sureties in his bond, which bad
been given for the faithful performance
of his duties as bookkeeper, from liability for errors committed in that capacity,
unless the errors were in some way
connected with some proper act on his
part as teller, or were superinduced by
his employment as such.
4. In Union Bank v. Clossey, 10
Johns. 271, s. c. 11 Id. 182, the bond
was conditioned that the principal would
"well and faithfully perform the duties
assigned to and trust reposed in him, as
first teller," &c. It was held to apply to
his honesty and not to his ability, and
that the sureties were not liable for a
loss arising to the bank from his mistake,
but only for a breach of trust. In
American Bank v. Adams, 12 Pick. 303,
it was held that a bond faithfully to perform the duties of teller bound the
obligors to a responsibility for reasonable
and competent skill and due and ordinary
diligence in the performance of his office
and. not for his honesty alone. In Minor
v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1
Peters 46, the condition of an official
bond that he should "well and truly"
execute the duties of cashier, was held
to include not merely honesty but reasonable skill and diligence. In Batchelor
v. Planters' National Bank, 78 Ky. 435,
after asserting a cashier's duty to supervise the action of his subordinates, it is
said: "The acceptance of the cashier's
bond does not preclude the bank or its
directors from designating the business
of a subordinate, and the character of
the work to be done by him. When not
interfering with the duties properly
belonging to the cashier, such action on
the part of the board cannot affect the
liability of the sureties, and if in. the
opinion of the board, the subordinate can

discharge the duties of both the teller
and general bookkeeper, his appointment
to both positions will not release the
sureties of the cashier, although the bond
may have been executed when the subordinate was acting only in the one
capacity."
II. It may be interesting in this connection to refer briefly to some of the
principles which govern the liability of
sureties on the official bonds of public
officers.
1. It seems to be held in general that
the liability of public officers is absolute
for the moneys received by them in their
official capacity. The fact that they may
have been robbed, or the money stolen
through no fault or neglect upon their
part, or that the bank in which they kept
their accounts has failed, is no excuse for
a failure to pay the money over:. Cox v
Blair, 76 N. 0. 78; Havens v. Lathene,
75 Id. 505 ; State v. Clarke, 73 Id. 255 ;
Perley v. Muslegon, 32 Mich. 132 ; Commonwealth v. Conly, 3 Penn. St. 372;
Taylor v. Morton, 37 Iowa 550: Union
v. Smith, 39 Id. 9 ; County of Redwood
v. Tower, 28 Minn. 45; County of
Hennepin v. Jones, 18 Id. 199 ; County
of McLeod v. Gilbert, 19 Id. 214;
Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 30 Ill.
99; United States v. Dashiel, 4 Wall.
182; United States v. Prescott, 3 Id.
587; United States v. Keelder, 9 Id.
83; Boyden v. United States, 13 Id. 17;
United States v. Thomas, 15 Id. 337;
Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind. 86; Rock v.
Stinger, 36 Id. 346 ; Steinback v. State,
38 Id. 483; New Providence v. Me.Eachron, 33 N. J. Law 339; Colerain
v. Bell, 9 Mete. 499 ; 3uzzy v. Shattucki, I Danio 233; and State v. Harper,
6 Ohio St. 607. The subject was considered by the Supreme Court of Maine
in 1879, and a contrary conclusion was
reached: Cumberlandv. Pennell, 69 Me.
357. His liability was there held to be
that of F bailee for hire.
In State v. Clarke, 73 N. C. 255, it
was held that county commissioners had
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no authority' to release a sheriff from his
obligation to pay over county moneys
which had been lost or stolen through
no fault of his. In Board of Education
v. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St. 227, it
was held to be in the power of the legislature to grant such relief. But in
People v. Supervisor, 16 Mich. 254, and
in Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Id. 123, it was
held that the legislature had no such
power, as it amounted to the auditing
of a private claim, a thing forbidden by
the constitution of that state.
2. Where a public officer executes an
official bond which is not required by
statute, such bond is void for want of a
consideration: State t. Heisey, 56 Iowa
404. And where a statutory bond goes
beyond the requirements of the statute,
it is, for the excess, without any obligaOtory force: United States v. Ellis, 4
Sawyer 592. Where an officer is required
to perform a duty special in its nature,
and to give a special bond for its faithful
performance, no liability attaches to his
general bondsmen for a default in the
performance of the special duty, in
the absence bf any declaration that they
shall also be liable: Board of Supervisors v. Ehlers, 45 '"is. 281 ; Commonwealth v. Toms, 45 Penn. St. 408; State
v. Johnson, 55 Mo. 80; Williams v.
Mor(on, 38 Me. 52; State v. Young,
23 Minn. 551; State v. Corey, 16 Ohio
St. 17; Henderson v. Coover, 4 Nev.
429 ; Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302;
People v. Moon, 3 Scam. 123.
3. Where the statute prescribes that an
officer shall hold during a stated term,
and until his successor is elected and
qualified, the question arises, whether the
sureties will be liable for delinquencies
committed after his stated period has
elapsed, but before his successor has
been appointed or qualified ? The authorities are not harmonious. Some few cases
hold that the sureties will continue liable
after the stated.period has elapsed, and
until the successor has been actually appointed and qualified: Long v. Seay, 72

Mo. 648; Thompson-v. State, 37 Miss.
518 ; Statev. Berg, 50 Ind. 496 ; Placer
County v. Dickerson, 45 Cal. 12; State
v. Daniel, 6 Jones (N. 0. Law) 444;
Sparks v. Bank, 9 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 365. But if the officer is himself re-elected or re-appointed, and thus
becomes his own successor, and fails to
give a new bond, the sureties on the
original bond will not be liable for a
default occurring in the second term:
Savings Bank v. Hunt, 72 Mo. 597;
Harris v. Babbitt, 4 Dillon 185.
The weight of authority, and the
better considered cases, hold that the
bond is only intended to cover the reasonable time necessary to enable a successor
to be elected and qualified, and that if a
default takes place after such reasonable
time has elapsed, the sureties will not be
liable: Bigelow v. Bridge, 8 Mass. 275 ;
Chelmsford v. Demarest,7 Gray I ; Dover
v. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59; Welch v.
Seymour, 28 Conn. 387 ; State Treasurer
v. allann, 34 Vt. 371 ; Mayor, 6-c., v.
Horn, 2 Harr. (Del.) 190 ; Insurance
Co. v. Smith, 2 Hill (S. C.) 590; South
Carolina Society v. Johnson, 1 MeCord
41 ; Committee of Public Accounts v.
Greenwood, 1 Desaus. (S. C.) 450;
County qf Wapello v. Bingham's Adm'r,
10 Iowa 40; Council of Montgomery v.
Hughes, 65 Ala. 201 ; Harrisv. Babbitt, 4
Dillon 185. In the case last cited, Mr.
Justice DisLoN says that even if a contrary rule should be recognised in the case
of public officers, and he appears to be
clearly of opinion that it should not, it
certainly should not be adopted in the
case of officers of private corporations
whose continuance in office under sucb
circumstances would be due to the
neglect of the officers entrusted by the
corporation to manage its affairs. The
results of their negligence should be
visited upon the corporation, and not
upun the sureties. A leading case on
this whole subject is that of Lord Arlington v. Merricke, 2 Saund. 403, which
came before Lord llE.
The bond
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recited that the principal had been
appointed deputy-postmaster for the
term of six months, and was conditioned
f6r his good behavior during all the
time he should continue deputy-postmaster. He continued in office two
years, and made default. The sureties
were held not liable. See, too, Kitson
v. Julian, 4 E. & B. 854.
4. While sureties are not liable by
reason of the subsequent imposition
by statute of new and different duties
materially changing the character of the
office, they are nevertheless liable for
the faithfal discharge of the duties of the
officer, existing at the time of signing
the bond, where those duties have not
been substantially or materially changed.
The bond remains a binding obligation
for what it was originally given to
secure: Gaussen v. United States, 79
U. S. 584 ; United States v. Kirkpatrick,
9 Wheat. 720 ; Commonwealth v. olmes,
25 Gratt, 771 ; Supervisors oJ Monroes
aountj v. Clarke, 25 Hun 286: Hatch
v. Attleborough, 97 Mass. 533; People v. Vilas," 36 N. Y. 459. The case
of Pqbus v. Gib~b, 6 B. & B. 902,
is not recognised.as good law in this
country. In that case the bond was
given for the faithful discharge of the
duties of high bailiff, the jurisdiction of
the court being fixed, by statute. After
the giving of the bond the jurisdiction
of the court was enlarged, materially
altering the duties of the bailiff. The
sureties were held not even liable for
misconduct, which was within the jurisdiction of the statute in force at the time
the bond was given. To that extent
it would seem to be opposed to the
American authorities.
In Alabama, under the Code, sureties
are liable for acts done in the discharge
of duties subsequently imposed: 3llorrow
v. Wood, 56 Ala. I ; M1cKee v. Griffin,
66 Id. 211.
5. The general rule, of course, is
that sureties are only liable for a defalcation which takes place during the term
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for which the bond was given: Stern v.
People, 96 Ill. 475; Bissell v. Saxton,
66 N. Y. 55. And the sureties will not
be made liable for a defalcation during
a preceding term by the fact that their
principal had, during the term for which
the bond was given, property out of
which he might have provided funds to
make good the default: Bissell v. Sax.ton, 77 N. Y. 191. Where an officer
has misappropriated funds during his
first term, and in his second term
actually pays into the public treasury all
the funds received by him during such
second term, but applies a portion of
such funds to the extinguishment of the
liabilities incurred by him during his
first term, the sureties on the second
bond will be liable to the extent of such
appropriation: State v. Sooy, 39 N. J.
Law 539; Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8
Wend. 403; s. c. 15 Id. 19 ; State v.
Smith, 26 Mo. 226; Inhabitants of Sandwich v. Fish, 2 Gray 298; Gwynne v.
Burnel, 7 Cl. & Fin. 572 ; AttorneyGeneral v. Manderson, 12 Jur. 383. In
Hoboken v. Kamena, 41 N. J. Law 438,
an officer was a defaulter during his first
term, and it was sought to hold the
sureties on the bond for the second term.
Counsel urged, as matter of law, that
the money received during the second
term must be considered as appropriated
to make good the misappropriations of
the first term, and that, thereby, it would
appear that he had not faithfully and
truly performed all the duties of the
second term.
The court, however,
viewed the subject in a different light,
and the sureties for the second term
were held not liable.
6. Where an officer holds for several
consecutive terms, and is found to be a
defaulter at the end of his last term, it
will be presumed, in the absence of
proof, that the entire default occurred
during the last term : Kelly v. State,
25 Ohio St. 567 : Kaqay v. Trustees of
Schools, 68 Ill. 75. If, at the commencement of his second term, he reports
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a certain sum in his hands, and gives law requiring the sureties, but by that
bond to account for and pay over moneys imposing the duties on the officer: Dyer
coming to his hands during the term, the v. Cozington Township, 28 Penn. St. 186.
. Of course no action can be maintained
sureties on the bond for the second term
will be responsible for the money so on an official bond for any misfeasance
reported to have been in his hands, and of any officer which is not within the
will not be allowed to show that the terms of the condition of the bond, or
defalcation in fact occurred during a in contemplation of the law requiring
previous term, so as to throw the liability the bond: Furlong v. State, 58 Miss.
on the sureties for the first term: Roper 717.
v. Sangamon Lodge, 91 Ill. 518; Cawley
8. In Vann v. Rpkin, 77 N. C. 408,
v. People, 95 Id. 249 ; Morley v. Town the law fixed the term of office at t&o
of Mfetamora, 78 Id. 394 ; and see *years, but required the bond to be reBoard of Education v. Fonda, 77 N. Y. newed annually. The bond was given
359 : United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. in September 1872, but was not renewed
187. Where the officer fails to make a in September 1873, although the prinreport at the close of his first term, and cipal continued in office. The statute
to make a settlement, it will not be pre- declared that a failure to renew the bond
sumed that he paid the funds of the first should create a vacancy in the office.
term to himself as his successor, and the The bond was conditioned for the faithful collection and payment of the taxes
sureties on the first bond will be liable:
received during his term of office. The
Coons v. People, 76 Ill. 383.
7. Sureties on the official bond of a default occurred in 1874. The sureties
public officer are liable for acts done were held liable. The court said the
Vnrtute offlcii, but not for those done eotore failure to renew the bond did upt of
officii: Huffeman v. Kopelkoin, 8 Nab. itself create a vacancy in the office, and
that it was necessary that proceedings
344; Ottenstein v. Alpaugh, 9 Id. 237.
The liability of sureties on official should first be taken to declare the office
bonds is not generally measured by the vacant.
HENRY WADn ROGERS.

United States Circuit Court, Northern Districtof Texas.
LAWRENCE v. NORTON.
An assignment for the benefit of those of the assignor's creditors who should
release him, with a reservation of the surplus to the assignor himself, is fraudulent
and void as to the creditors not releasing.
Statutes allowing preferences among creditors should be strictly construed, and
assignments creating such preferences should be held vpid, when not in strict compliance with the terms of the law.
A Texas statute authorized any debtor to make an assignment for the benefit of
such of his creditors only as would consent to discharge him, and provided that in
such case the benefit of the assignment should be limited to such creditors. Held,
that the statute must be confined in its operation to assignments which transferred
all of the debtor's property for the benefit of creditors, and did not validate an
assignment by which the debtor reserved to himself an interest Mnthe surplus after
paying the releasing creditors.
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DEmURRER to petition.

This action was for damages for trespass in seizing and converting certain goods alleged by plaintiff to have belonged to him.
Plaintiff set out his ownership as derived under a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors, dated October 24th 1881, between
the debtor of the first part, the assignee of the second part, and
the creditors "who shall hereafter accede to these presents" of the
third part, whereby the debtor assigned to I. G. Lawrence all his
zeal estate and goods or chattels "in trust and confidence to sell
and dispose of said real and personal estate, and to collect said
choses in action, using a reasonable discretion as to the times and
modes of selling and disposing of said estate, as it respects making
sales for cash or on credit, at public auction or by private contract,
taking a part for the whole where the trustee shall deem it expedient so to do; then in trust to dispose of the proceeds of said
property in the manner following, viz:
1. To pay the cost and charges of these presents, and the expenses
of executing the trusts herein declared, together with all taxes,
which are a charge upon any of said property.
2. To distribute and pay the remainder of the said proceeds to and
among all the parties of the third part who will accept thereof in
full satisfaction of their claims against said party of the first part,
ratably, in proportion to their respective debts.
8. To pay over any surplus, after paying all the parties of the
third part who shall accede hereto, as aforesaid, in full, to the
party of the first part, his executors, administrators or assigns, and
the party of the first part hereby constitutes and appoints the
party of the'second part his attorney irrevocable, with power of
substitution, authorizing him in the name of the party of the irst
part, or otherwise, as the case may require, to do any and all acts,
matters and things, to carry into effect the true intent and meaning
of these presents, which the party of the first part might do if
personally present; and the party of the second part hereby accepting these trusts covenants to and with each of the other parties
hereto, to execute the same faithfully; and the party of the first
part hereby covenants with the said trustee, from time to time and
at all times when requested, to give him all the information in his
power respecting the assigned property, and to execute and deliver
all such instruments of further assurance as the party of the second part shall be advised by counsel to be necessary in order to
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carry into full effect the true intent and meaning of these presents,
and the parties of the third part, by acceding hereto, and by accepting the benefits herein conferred, hereby and thereby agree to
and with the said party of the first part, to release him from any and
all claim or claims, debt or debts, demand or demands, of whatever
nature, which they respectively have and bold against him, and this
assignment is made for the benefit of such of the parties of the
third part only as will consent to accept their proportionate share
of the said estate of the said party of the first part and discharge
him from their respective claims.
Defendant demurred.
JHenry &' Eill, for plaintiff.

Crawford & Smith, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The demurrer presents the question whether
che foregoing assignment is fraudulent on its face, and therefore
void as against the assignor's creditors.
If it is valid and shall be carried out, and the trust administered
according to the terms specified, its effect against creditors who do
not grant the exacted release, will be to delay them, according to
the discretion of the assignee, for an indefinite period in their
remedies against the property upon faith of which they gave
credit, if their remedies are not entirely lost; and finally, after"
this indefinite delay, remit them to proceedings against their original debtor, after his ass ts have been converted into ready cash,
and put into his pocket beyond the reach of writs of fieri facias.
In short, in such case the debtor has enacted a forced stay law
during the discretion of his agent, to enable him to convert his
property into such convenient shape that he may enforce other
terms (to suit his convanience) with his already delayed creditors.
If the assignment is held valid, but the trus.t is administered
according to the state laws, which it is argued have the effect to
validate all assignments, curing all frauds, in act or intent, and
to a certain extent making a contract for the assignor, the effect
is practically the same. except that if there is any surplus, after
preferred creditors amd expenses, &c., are paid, it may be paid
into court to be litigated for.
In this latter case as to the administration under the state law
PARDBE,

LAWRENCE v. NORTON.

a number of curious queries suggest themselves, which, if they
were satisfactorily answered, might induce creditors to view assignments under the law with more favor. Where and when is the
assignment to be recorded? When is it to take effect? How
long may the assignee carry it in his pocket ?
Suppose that no creditor accepts the terms of the debtor ? Could
the assignment be set aside? If so, when ? After the full administration of the assignee, or at the expiration of four months ?
When is a dividend to be paid accepting creditors? When the
assignee can pay 10 per cent. of the accepting creditor's claims, or
when he has funds in hand sufficient to pay 10 per cent. of the
debts due by "the assignee ?"
Suppose the assignee can collect only enough, after reasonable.
compensation, necessary expenses and attorney's fee at discretion
are paid, to pay 9 per cent. of the debts due by the assignor ?
Many other questions suggest themselves, but all, including the
foregoing, throw no light on this case-they being referred to
only because the policy of the law has been discussed at the bar,
and very ably justified and defended.
The assignment af6resaid makes several dispositions and conditions in conflict with the law which is relied on to maintain it,
but the chief objection made to its validity is, that the assignment
is not complete of the assignor's interests, but that the assignor
reserves an interest in his own favor in the property assigned.
The Act of March 24th 1879, Texas Laws, Acts of 1879, chap.
53, p. 57, provides :
"Sect. 1. That every assignment made by an insolvent debtor,
or in contemplation of insolvency, for the benefit of his creditors,
shall provide, except as herein otherwise provided for, a distribution of all his real and personal estate other than that which is
by law exempt from execution, among all his creditors in proportion to their respective claims, and however made shall have the
effect aforesaid; and shall be construed to pass all such estate
whether specified therein or not. Any and every assignment shall
be proved or acknowledged and certified, and recorded in the same
manner as is provided by law in conveyance of real estatb or other
property.
"Sect. 3. Any debtor desiring so to do may make an assignment for the benefit of such of his creditors only as will consent to
accept their proportionate share of his estate, and discharge him
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from their respective claims, and in such case the benefit of the
assignment shall be limited and restricted to the creditors consenting
thereto. The debtor shall thereupon be, and stand discharged from
all further liabilities to such consenting creditors on account of
their respective claims, and when paid, they shall execute and
deliver to the assignee for the debtor a release therefrom."
Upon the construction of these two sections, and upon the common law the validity of the aforesaid assignment depends; see
Article 3218, Revised Code of Texas.
It seems that by the sections aforesaid, two classes of assignments are allowed.
Under the first section, assignments for the benefit of all the
creditors, which are aided by the law, and naturally would be
favored by the courts.
Under the third section, assignments for the benefit of preferred
creditors, who are preferred on their own election, under stress of
a penalty forfeiting their claim, which assignment is not in terms
aided by the law, and naturally is not favored by the courts.
Prior to the Act of 1879, an assignment, such as the one now
under consideration, would have been adjudged void on its face,
because therein the assignor reserved an interest in the estate
assigned. [See the leading cases in Texas: Baldwin v. Peet, 22
Texas 708, and Baily v. Mills, 27 Id. 434; also Barney v.
Griffn, 2 N. Y. (Comstock) Court of Appeals, 365; Leitch v.
Hollister, 4 Id. 211.]
In the last cited case it is said, that "the effect of such an assignment is to withdraw the property of the debtor from legal process,
and to compel creditors to await the execution of the trust before
they can reach the surplus reserved to the former. As those who
are excluded from the benefits of the assignment cannot enforce its
execution, they are necessarily hindered and delayed,' and consequently, in legal contemplation, defrauded. - It is of no consequence whether the surplus is large or small, or whether anything
remains after the payment of preferred creditors."
The creation of the trust shows that a surplus was in the contemplation of the parties, and its reservation for the benefit of the
assignor, is a fraud upon creditors.
These cases, and the arguments so clearly expressed, have lost nio
force by lapse of tine.
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The statute aforesaid was passed in the sight of them, and I
think it must be construed in harmony with them.
Counsel have handed in two late decisions of the Supreme
Court of Texas, not yet reported, in which that learned tribunal
has passed upon two cases arising under the statute aforesaid.
The first, Blum v. Wellborn, goes to the extent of holding that
an assignment that evidences the intention to pass to the assignee
all of the property of a debtor subject to a forced sale for the purpose of distribution among creditors, and executed in substantial
compliance with the requirements of the act, will be aided by the
law as to form, and will not be avoided by fraud between the
assignor and assignee in secreting and appropriating portions of
the property assigned.
In the second case, Donoho v. Fish, Brothers & Co., it is held
that the law cannot make an assignment for the debtor, but that it
aids an assignment which evidences an intention of the debtor to
comply with its provisions; that the provisions of the third section
of the Act of 1879, must be construed in harmony with the principles laid down by the courts of the several states in which it has
been held, in the absence of a statute, that such restrictions upon
the rights of the creditors generally might be imposed by the
debtor, and that an assignment containing such restrictions, which
does not of itself, or with the aid of the law, transfer all of the
ddbtor's property for the benefit of his creditors, is void upon its
face.
Following these two cases, as to the construction to be given to
the Act of 1879, keeping in mind that the law cannot make a
contract for the debtor, and that where a debtor seeks to force
releases from his creditors under the third section of the act, he
must resign all of his property not exempt, I feel warranted in
holding, under the lights to which the court refers me, and hereinbefore cited that, as in the assignment before the court the
assignee has expressly reserved an interest to himself to the exclusion of his creditors, the same is on its face null and void and of
no effect.
Under the principles of the civil law, declaring that the property of the debtor is the common pledge of all the creditors, and
which principles are sound in justice and equity, all laws and acts
preferring creditors ought to be strictly cons.trued, and always
avoided when not in strict compliance with the terms of the law.
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On general principles, therefore, I am of opinion that the third
section of the Act of 1879, as allowing an unfair and partial
assignment, should be strictly construed, and, therefore, that the
assignment in this case should be held null and void.
The other points argued will not be considered.
The demurrer to the amended original petition is sustained.
McCoRMICK, J., concurred.
When will an assignment for the benefit of creditors be deemed fraudulent in
law and void on its face, as against
dissenting creditors, on the ground that
it contains provisions for the benefit of
the debtor himself to the prejudice of his
creditors ?
FIST. Reservations of Property.-An
assignment wherein the debtor reserves
for his own use any portion of the property assigned, except such as is exempt
by law from levy and sale on execution,
is void. For example: an assignment
stipulating for the payment of a specified
sum, for the support of the debtor and
his family for a limited time (Maclkie v.
Cairns, 5 Cow. 547) ; or during the continuance of the trust (Richards v. Hazzard, 1 Stew. & P. 139) ; or for the
support of himself and wife while they
live, and the rest of his family until able
to maintain themselves (.Tohnston v. Harvy, 2 P. & W. 82); or a stipulation
for the payment of the debtor's current
family expenses before the payment of
any debts: Henderson v. Downing, 24
Miss. 106. Compare McAllister v. M1arshall, 6 Binn. 338; Harris v. Sumner,
2 Pick. 129 ; Arthurv. Commercial Bank,
17 Miss. 394; Citizens' Fire Tns. Co. v.
Wallis, 23 Md. 173 ; Whallon v. Scott,
10 Watts 237.
An assignment is void which provides
for the payment of the debtor's expenses
in obtaining the benefit of the insolvent
act, and the costs of defending actions
by his creditors to recover their debts:
Sewall v. Russell, 2 Paige 175 ; Fiance
v. Schermerhorn, 3 Barb. Ch. 644. The

debtor 'cannot provide that his attorneys
shall be paid a certain sum for future
services and advice as to the execution
of the trust, though a provision for payment of his attorneys for services in
preparing the assignment and securing
its proper proof and record, is valid: U.
S. District Court, N. D. Miss., 1881
Hill v. Agnew, 12 Fed. Rep. 230.
An assignment is void which provides
for the payment of the assignee for his
future advances to, and future liabilities
for, the assignor, in preference to, or
to the exclusion of debts contracted
prior to the assignment. Such an attempt
to secure a future credit and benefit to
the assignor cannot be sustained: Barnum v. Eempstead, 7 Paige 568; Currie
v. Hart, 2 Sandf. Oh. 353. For the
same reason, a provision for the security
of all who should become indorsers for
the debtor vitiates the assigriment:
Lansing Y. Woodvorth, 1 Sandf. Ch. 43.
But the debtor may provide for thp
security of one who is contingently liable
as indorser for him (Barnum v. Hempstead, supra), and hence an assignment
to pay debts "due and to grow due,"
was held valid, as referring only to
existing liabilities, whether matured or
to mature: Van Hook v. Walton, 28 Tex.
59.
The assignment is not void by reason
of the failure of the debtor to convey all
his property, but by reason of his reservation of some part of the property conveyed.
He may except a portion of his property
from the operation of the conveyance,
since as the title to such portion has
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never passed to the assignee, it remains
in his bands, open to the pursuit of
creditors, as if no assignment.had been
made, and their remedies against it have
not been hindered or delayed: Carpenter
v. Underwood, 19 N. Y. 520; Knight v.
Waterman, 36 Penn. St. 258; Bates v.
Ableman, 13 Wis. 644; Canal Bank v.
Cox, 6 Me. 395 ; Ingrahamv. Grigg, 21
Miss. 22. Thus, an assignment of all
the debtor's property of every description, "reserving to myself, however, out
of the aforesaid" property, certain articles, was held invalid as a reservation
out of the property conveyed (Sungg v.
Tillman, 2 Swan 208) ; while in another
case in the same state, an assignment of
all the debtor's property "except such
as is exempt from execution," was held
valid, without regard to the" fact of
exemption, as an exception from the
operation of the conveyance: Farquharson v. McDonald, 2 Heisk. 404.
A reservation of such property as is
by law exempt from levy and sale on execution, will not make the assigiment void,
since the creditors are not hindered by the
debtor's retaining that which they had
no right to touch : Mulford v. Shdrk, 26
Penn. St. 473 ; Knight v. Waterman, 36
Id. 258; Lininger v. Raymond, 9 Neb.
40. But the cases are in conflict as to
the necessity of specifically describing
the property reserved by the debtor under
the exemption laws. Some authorities
hold a specific mention of the property
is not necessary, and that a reservation
of "I such property as is by law exempt,"
is valid: Richardson v. Marqueze, 59
Miss. 80; Brooks v. Nichols, 17 Mich.
38 ; 1ollister v. Loud, 2 Id. 309;
Garnorv. Frederick, 18 Ind. 507 ; Mfulford v. Shirk, 26 Penn. St. 473. A
re-servation of the "benefit of any and
all exemption laws," will not avoid the
assignment: Heckman v. Messinger, 49
Penn. St. 465. On the other hand, an
assignment reserving "so much as I am
by law allowed to retain free from execution," has been held void, the court
VOL. XXXI.-34

saying: "How

are excluded creditors

to know what articles in particular are
claimed under those acts (of exemption),
if they are thrown into confusion with a
large quantity of the same nature and
description. The person claiming the
benefit of exemption must set apart what
the law allows him, that it may be
known by all who are concerned, and
separated from that part of his estate
which is subject to his debts. But in
this deed, it is included in the conveyance
with the mass of his property and reserved
in general terms. Creditors are not
able to judge whether the quantity or
kind of property specified in the law is
claimed, as there is no separation or
description of it:" Sugg v. Tillman,
2 Swan 208. An assignment reserving
"property to the value of $400 each
which said" assignors " shall elect to
retain as stock in trade under the laws
of the State of Kansas exempting certain property from sale on execution or
other process," was held void on its face
(Clark v. Robbins, 8 Kans. 574) ; though
the same court held an assignment by a
partnership of all their property "except
what is by law exempt," valid, the
provision being nugatory, as none of the
assigned property was exempt: Dodd v.
Hills, 21 Kans. 707.
SEOOND. Reservation of possessionand
control.-If the debtor reserves the right
to retain possession of the property
assigned, or stipulates for its use, this is
deemed a reservation for his benefit
inconsistent with the right of creditors,
and will, in general, render the assignment void : Spence v. Bagwell, 6 Gratt.
444; Sheppards v. Turpin, 3 Id. 378;
Lockhart v. Wyatt, 10 Ala. 231 ; Montgomery's Rx'rs v. Kirksey, 26 Id. 172 ;
King v. Kenan, 38 Id. 63; Knight v.
Pavker, 12 N. J. Eq. 214. An assignment reciting that it was understood that
the debtor might retain possession until
default in payment, was held void: Reed
.v. Pelletier, 28 Mo. 173. And the vice
of such a stipulation is not cured by a
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provision that the assignor shall give
bond, with good security, to the assignee,
to deliver the property on the day of
sale. He has no right to substitute such
security for the property assigned : Green
v. Trieber, 3 Md..11. But this rule has
not been fully adopted in some cases.
Thus, it has been held that a stipulation
to retain possession as the agent of the
trustees and under their control, was
valid (Janney v. Barnes, 11 Leigh 100,
as explained in Sheppards v. Turpin, 3
Gratt. 373) ; and in a later case in the
same State, an assignment reserving possession until a specified day and the right
to receive the profits of business unless
the assignor consented to an earlier sale
of the property, was held not void on its
face, on the authority of prior decisions,
though their soundness was doubted:
Dance v. Seaman, 11 Gratt. 778. In a
recent case, a deed of trust, conveying,
among other property, land, horses, cattle, farming implements, household and
kitchen furniture, growing grain and
vegetables, and stipulating for possession
by the grantor for three years, upon his
paying interest on the debts provided for,
was held not fraudulent per se, although
some of the property reserved would be
consumed in the use. It might inditectly
strengthen the security by ministering to
the improvement and support of the
important and substantial subjects, relied
on as security: Sipe v. .Earman,26 Gratt.
563. It is to be noticed, moreover, that
this property could not have been made
available to a judgment creditor, by
reason of the stay law. In Baxter v.
Wheeler, 9 Pick. 21, al assignment,
containing a covenant on the part of the
trustees to allow the assignor to use and
occupy the property, committing no waste
thereon, until it should be sold or disposed of in the due execution of the
trust, was held not per se fraudulent.
In Young v. Booe, 11 Ired. L. 347, a
deed of trust of a cotton factory, providing that the grantor might retain,
possession for eleven months, and his

family be supported during that time,
out of the profits of the business, was
held not necessarily void, but that the
question was for the jury whether the
provisions were for the benefit of the
creditors. See also, Moore v. Collins, 3
Dev. 126. In Perry Ins. Co. v. Foster,
58 Ala. 502, an assignment reserving
possession of growing crops to be
delivered to the trustee as soon as
gathered, was sustained. If the time
fixed for sale of the assigned propersy
be reasonable, a reservation of possession
until sale, is not a badge of fraud : Hempstead v. Johnston, 18 Ark. 123.
The equitable interests in the assigned
property should be fixed and determined
irrevocably in the assignment itself, and
nothing should be left subject to the
future control or discretion of the assignor: Barnum v. Hermpstead, 7 Paige
568; Pierson v. Manning, 2 Iich. 445.
If the assignor reserves the right of
revoking or altering the trusts, the assignment is void: Murray v. Riggs, 15
Johns. 571. He cannot reserve the
right to give a subsequent preference
(Sheldon v. Dodge, 4 Dev. 217 ; Hyslop
v. Clarke, 14 Johns. 458; Kercheis v.
Schloss, 49 How. Pr. 284; Mitchell v.
Stiles, 13 Penn. St. 182):; although he
fixes a definite time within which to
declare the preference : Averill v. Loucks,
6 Barb. 470. It has been held, however,
that an assignment is not void on its
face, which reserves to the assignor the
privilege of adding to the number of
preferred creditors, others of the same
class: Cannon v. Peebles, Ired. L. 204And the same was held of an assignment
pay such other debts as we
"to
(assignors) may hereafter specify, out
of any surplus, which may be left after
paying all the claims and debts in this
deed of assignment first specified :" I Hill
v. Wheeler, 13 Ind. 371.
A reservation of the right to appoint
another trustee in place of the one named
(Fellows v. Commereial Bank, 6 Rob.
(La.) 246), or to name his successor
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(PlanS: v. Schermerhorn, 3 Barb. Ch.
644), vitiates the assignment, though a
reservation of power to appoint a subsequent trustee in case the one named
declines to accept the trust, is valid:
Vansands v. Miller, 24 Conn. 180.
The services of the assignor may be
almost indispensable to the assignee in
the execution of the trust, and although
the assignment is not avoided by a clause
empowering him to employ the assignor
in winding up his affairs, if he thinks
proper (Planters' v. Herchants' Bank of
Mobile, 7 Ala. 765 ; Coate v. Williams,
21 L. J.Exch. (N. S.) 116 ; 9 Eng. L.
& Eq. 481 ; Mirks v. Hill, 15 Gratt.
400), it is void if it stipulates that the
assignee shall employ him: MfeClurg v.
Lecky, 3 Penn. & W. (Pa.) 83. In
RindskolT v. Guggenheim, 3 Cold. 284,
the assignment contained a clause that
the trustee "Iis to employ clerks, including" the assignor, but it was held valid,
the court regarding the matter as left
entirely to the discretion of the trustee.
An assignment which stipulates that
the debtor shall have the right to continue
and dispose of the
business and to sell
goods assigned in the usual course of
business, is void : Holme v. MIarshall,
78 N. C. 262 ; Brooks v. Wimer, 20
Mlo. 503; Billingsley's Admr. v. Bunce,
28 Id. 547 ; Xing v. Kenan, 38 Ala.
63; Berry v. Riley, 2 Barb. 307; Hill
v. Agnew, 12 Fed. Rep. 230; Smith v.
Leavitts, 10 Ala. 92. An assignment
empowering the trustee at his discretion
to sell the property, consisting of a stock
in trade "gradually, in the manner and
on the terms on which in the course of
their business," the assignors "have
sold and disposed of their merchandise"
is void on its face, and cannot be made
good by proof that the provision was inserted for the benefit of creditors and was
to their advantage: American Exchange
B'zk v. Inloes, 7 Aid. 380; 11 Id. 173.
TinD. Stipulationsfor release.-The
question is, whether an assignment is
rendered fraudulent and void on its face,

by reason of a stipulation for release of
the debtor in full, either as a condition
of participation in the benefits of the
assignment, or as d condition of preference. To adopt the language of the
court in Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Gratt.
410; "No man can read Burrill on
Assignments, in which all or nearly all
the cases on this subject are collected,
without being struck, if not confounded,
by the great conflict among them. Not
only does this conflict exist between the
decisions of one State and those of
another, but often the decisions of the
same state are conflicting in themselves.
Courts after going in one direction have
veered about and gone in another, until
the legislature has had to interpose and
solve the difficulty."
In New York, the doctrine against the
validity of assignments containing stipulations for release has been carried to
the extent of holding the assignment
void when the release is made a condition
of preference merely. "Why should a
debtor be permitted in this way to operate
upon the fears of his creditors, and coerce
them into his own terms. * * * If a
debtor, therefore, with his property in
his own hands, and open to the legal
pursuit of his creditors, can satisfy them
that it is for their interest or the interest
of any of them, to accept 2s. 6d. in the
pound, and give him an absolute discharge, there is no legal objection to it;
they treat upon equal terms ; the ordinary
legal remedies of the creditors are not
obstructed. But the case is materially
changed when the debtor first places his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, and then proposes to them terms
of accommodation. Re obstructs their
legal remedies, hinders and delays them
in the prosecution of their suits by putting his property into the hands of
trustees, with the view of getting an
absolute discharge from his debts, and
exempting his future acquisitions from
all liability. It has been decided in this
court, that the reservation of the least
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pecuniary provision for the assignor or
his family, renders an assignment of
this description fraudulent and void.
How much more valuable is a discharge
from his debts, or a portion .of them,
to an insolvent debtor, than a temporary
pecuniary pittance. Let the embarrassed
debtor, therefore, assign his property
for the benefit of whom he pleases; but
let the assignment be absolute and
unconditional; let it contain no reservations or conditions for the benefit of the
assignor ; let it not extort from the fears
and apprehensions of the creditors or
any of them, an absolute discharge of
their debts as the consideration of a partial dividend; let it not convert the
debtor into a dispenser of alms to his
own creditors; and above all, let it not
put up his favor and bounty at auction
under the cover of a trust, to be bestowed
upon the highest bidder." Per SUTHERLAND, J., in Grover v. Wakeman, 11
Wend. 187. The contrary doctrine, so
far as to allow such stipulations as a
condition of preference, has been maintained in several States : Gordonv. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387; Nightingale v.
Harris, 6 R. I. 321 ; Rankin v. Lodor,
21 Ala. 380: Fznlaiy v. Dickerson, 29 Ill.
9. "This must be regarded as a mode
of creating a preference among creditors,
and the act of the releasing thi. debts
voluntary on the part of the creditors,
and therefore not objectionable :" Hall
v. Denison, 17 Vt. 310.
Upon the question of the validity of
assignments Which make a release a condition of participation in any of the
benefits of the assignment, judges and
text-writers disagree as to the weight
of authority. In a recent case, of first
impression, in Arkansas, the decisions
on the point were reviewed at length,
and the weight of authority declared to
be in favor of the validity of such
assignments: Clayton v. Johnson, 36
Ark. 406.
This doctrine, except as
affected by statute, is firmly established
in Pennsylvania (Liplpincott v. Barker,

2 Binn. 174; Bayne v. Wylie, 10 Watts
309; Wilson v. Kneppley, 10 S. & R.
439; Lea's Appeal, 9 Barr 504) ; is
maintained in Virginia on the authority
of prior decisions, though its soundness
is questioned (Gordon v. Cannon, 18
Gratt. 387 ; Sipwzth's .Ex'rv. Cunningham, 8 Leigh 271 ; Kevan v. Branch,
I Gratt. 274); and is held in other
states: McCall v. Hinkley, 4 Gill 128;
Haven v. Richardson, 5 N. H. 113;
Canal Bank v. Cox, 6 Me. 395; Nostrandv. Atwood, 19 Pick. 281 ; Aiken v.
Price, Dudley 50; Rankin v. Lodor,
21 Ala. 380; Dockray v. Doccray, 2
R. I. 547. In England, such an assignment has been held valid even against
a claim of the crown : King v. Watson,
As upholding the
3 Price (Excb.) 6.
New York doctrine, declaring such assignments fraudulent and void: see
Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns. 458; Lee
v. Talcott, 19 N. Y. 146; Austin v.
Bell, 20 Johns. 442 ; Searing v. Brinkerhoff, 5 Johns. Ch. 329; Atkinson v.
JTordon, 5 Ohio 289 ; Con/ling v.
Carson, 11 Ill. 503; Henderson v. Bliss,
8 Ind. 100.
In those states, upholding such assignments, it is held essential that all the
property of the debtor should be conveyed to the assignee: Green v. Trieber,
3 Md. 11 ; Sangston v. Gaither, Id. 40.
Hence, if an assignment by partners
exacts releases, it is deemed fraudulent
and void, unless it conveys the separate
property of each partner as well as the
partnership assets: Thomas v. JTenks,
5 Eawle 221; Hennessey v. Western
Bank, 6 W. & S. 300. In re Wilson,
4 Penn. St. 430; contra, Spencer v.
Jackson, 2 R. I. 35. The assignment is
valid if it conveys substantially all the
debtor's property: Gordon v Cannon,
IS Gratt. 387. Thus, an assignment by
a firm, which stipulated for releases,
was aeld not void, because a house and
lot belonging to a partner, which was
encumbered beyond its full value, was
not included in the conveyance: Fassit
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v.. Phillips, 4 Whart. 399. As to the respect between an assignment by a
bank or other corporation and one by
effect of an express or implied reservation of the surplus to the grantor, in an an individual: Dana v. Bak of U. S.,
5 W. & S. 223.
assignment stipulating for releases, see
Where an assignment provides for
infra.
only a part of the creditors, and reserves
It is also essential that such an assignto the assignor the surplus after the payment should fix the time within which
ment of the debts provided for, it is
creditors must make their election. If
it fixes no time, within which the release held in New York and a few other states,
to render the assignment fraudulent and
must be executed, it is void : Mayer v.
void on its face, and that it cannot be
Shields, 59 Miss. 107. The reason of
made good by showing that there would
.this is obvious. If "no time whatever
be no surplus after paying the preferred
is specified, the deed necessarily and
creditors : Goodrich v. Downs, 6 Bill
inevitably works a fraud on creditors.
None of them can receive anything until 438 ; Barney v. Guffin, 2 N. Y. 365 ;
allhave made up their minds, and as no Lansing v. Woodworth, I Sandf. Oh. 43;
Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9; fairchild
time is fixed within which they must do
v. Hunt, t4 N. J. Eq. 367 ; Truitt v.
this, the trust can never be wound up,
Caldwell, 3 Minn. 364; Lill v. Brant,
save by the interposition of a court of
6 Bradw. 366; Schwab v. .Evaus, Id.
equity :" Id. The assignment is void
466. Thus, where a firm assigned all
if it fixes an unreasonable time, within
the firm property and certain real estate
which creditors must elect. What is a
of which the partners were tenants in
reasonable time depends on the circumstances of the case. "It must not be so common, and reserved the surplus after
payment of the firm debts, the asshort as to deprive creditors of a fair
opportunity to investigate and determine signment was held void, because of
the question, nor yet so long as to pro- the reservation without providing for
payment of the individual debts of
duce unreasonable delay in the applicathe partners': Collomb v. Caldwell, 16 N.
tion of the property to the liquidation
of the debts:" Id. See, also, Gordon -Y. 484; Goddard v. Hapgood, 25 Vt.
351: Therasson v. .ickok, 37 Id. 454;
v. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387 ; Halsey v.
ithough it would have been otherwise if
Whitney, 4 Mason 206 ; Henderson v.
Bliss, 8 Ind. 100; Pearpointv. Graham, firm property only had been assigned:
Collomb v. Caldwell, supra; Bogert v.
4 Wash. C. C. 232.
Raight, 9 Paige 297, 302. But an
FOURTi. Reservation of Surplus. When
assignment of a portion of the debtor's
will a reservation to the debtor of the
surplus remaining after satisfying the property to pay part of his debts, and
not expressly providing for distribution
purposes of the trust render the assignWhere the of a possible surplus among his other
ment void on its face?
creditors, is not void on its face by
assignment provides for the payment of
reason of the resulting trust in the
all the debts, it is not avoided by a prodebtor's favor after the debts specified
vision for re-assignment of any property
are paid, unless it is merely colorable
or re-payment of any surplus in the hands
of the assignee after fulfilling the trust, as and made for the sake of the resulting
this is no more than the law implies with- trust: Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 335 ;
out any such provision: Sangston v. Gai- Doremus v. Leuls, 8 Barb. 124; contra,
Pierson v. Manning, 2 Mich. 445. An
ther, 3 Md. 40; Wintringham v. Lafoy, 7
Cow. 735; Hempstead v. Johnston, 18 assignment of property, insufficient to
pay the debts provided for, is not
Ark. 123; Lininger v. Raymond, 9 Neb.
40. And there is no distinction in this rendered void by the absence of any
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provision for the application of a surplus
to other creditors: Bishop v. Halsey, 3
Abb. Pr. 400 ; nor by an express reservation according to Andrews v. Ludlow,
22 Mass. 28; Richards v. Levin, 16
Mo. 596. On the other hand, an assignment, to pay specified debts, of a
larger amount of property than the
trustee is authorized to distribute, is
void, because of the resulting trust to
the assignor after those debts are paid:
Hooper v. Tuckerman, 3 Sandf. 311;
Whallon v. Scott, 10 Watts 237.
That assignments to pay only part of
the assignor's creditors, and expressly
reserving the surplus, are not necessarily void, is maintained by the weight
of authority, on the ground that the
reservation is but the expression of the
legal effect of the conveyance, and that
creditors can pursue their remedies
against the debtor, following the surplus
either in his hands or those of the trustee: Perry Ins. Co. v. Foster, 58 Ala.
502; Miller v. Stetson, 32 Id. 161;
Vew Albany, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Huff,
19 Ind. 444; Livingston v. Bell, 3
W. & S. 198; Elyv. Hair, 16 B. Mon.
230; Rowland v. Coleman, 45 Ga. 204;
Dance v. Seaman, 11 Gratt. 778 ; Johnson v. McAllister's Assignee, 30 Mo.
327. "1This reservation of the surplus,
remaining after the payment of the
debts secured by the terms of the assignment, is obviously nothing more than
a stipulation for the performance of a
duty which the law would recognise
and enforce without such stipulatioi ;
and how it can become a conclusive
badge of fraud, is, on principle, difficult
to perceive :" Floyd v. Smith, 9 Ohio
St. 546.
The cases are in conflict, without any
decided preponderance of authority, as
to whether an assignment stipulating
for a release is rendered invalid by
reason of a reservation to the assignor
of the surplus after satisfying the claims
of creditors who consent to release the
debtor. The doctrine of the principal

case, that an express reservation of the
surplus in such an assignment avoids it,
is supported by the decisions of several
states: Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns.
458; Berry v. Riley, 2 Barb. 307 ;
Green v. Trieber, 3 Md. 11 ; McFarland
v. Birdsall, 14 Ind. 126. And it is
held that an implied reservation of the
surplus, where the assignment makes
no disposition of that remaining after
paying releasing creditors, vitiates the
assignment equally with an expres,
reservation: Malcolm v. Hodges, 8 Md.
418; Bridges v. Hindes, 16 Id. 101 :
Whedbee v. Stewart, 40 Id. 414. In
a recent case in the U. S. District Court
for Mississippi, an assignment making
a release in full a condition of payment of a certain per cent. of the debt,
without providing for a distribution of
any surplus among the non-assenting
creditors, was held void on its face,
although it provided for the payment
of all other creditors out of the surplus
remaining after paying the specified per
cent. of the preferred debts, as it appeared from the face of the assignment
"and schedule annexed that nothing would
'be left to the non-assenting creditors.
" The vice of the release demanded
cannot be cured by a contingency, which
it is apparent from the face of the conveyance, schedule and proof, can never
take place :' Seale v. Vaiden, 10 Fed.
Rep. 831.
That an assignment stipulating for a
release is not necessarily void, although
it do not direct any surplus which may
remain after satisfying the claims of the
accepting and releasing creditors to be
applied to the payment of other debts,
or even though it direct any such surplus to be paid to the debtor himself, is
maintained by a number of authorities:
Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387; Haven
v. Richardson, 5 N. H. 113; Conkling
v. Carson, 11 Ill. 503; Finlay v. Dickerson, 29 Id. 9; Todd v. Buckman, 11
Mle. 41; Livingston v. Bell, 3 Watts
198; Mechanics' Bank v. Gorman, j
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W. & S. 304; Brown v. Lyon, 17 Ala.
659. * In Nightingale v. Harris, 6 R. I.
321, such an assignment was held not
vitiated by an implied reservation to the
assignor of the surplus, it being shown

from the relative value of the property
assigned, and the amount of the debts,
that no resulting trust could result to
the debtor.
.
WAYLAND E. BENJtjA~

Supreme Court of Iowa.
GREEN v. WILDING.
When the court can pronounce the contract of an infant to be to his prejudice, it
is void, and when to his benefit, as for necessaries, it is good ; and when the contract is of an uncertain nature, as to benefit or prejudice, it is voidable only at the
election of the infant.
A conveyance of land by an infant for a money consideration, not shown to have
been inadequate, is voidable at the election of the infant within a reasonable time
after attaining majority.
What is a reasonable time within the meaning of the statute, depends upon the
circumstances of each case.
Where the only excuse offered for a delay of three or four years in bringing suit
to avoid the conveyance of a minor was, that plaintiff was informed by others than
those competent to give legal advice, that she could not maintain a suit till her
younger brother reached his majority, and she waited three months, after being
informed that she could disaffirm her contract, before commencing action. Beld,
that the act of disaffirmance was not within a reasonable time.

from Pottawattamie District Court.
This was an action in equity to compel the defendant to reconvey
to the plaintiff the undivided one-third of certain eighty acres of
land. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition. The plaintiff
appealed. The facts are stated in the opinion.
APPEAL

Ament

" Sims, for appellant.

Wright . Baldwin, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAY, J.-In 1869, one C. H. Barton died seised of the land in
question, leaving his widow, Rebecca Barton, and his children,
Charles B. Barton and the plaintiff, his sole legal heirs. On the
19th of February 1872, Rebecca, Ida and Charles Barton, for
the consideration of $800, conveyed the land in controversy to

the defendant.

At the time of this conveyance the plaintiff was
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thirteen oi fourteen years of age, and Charles Barton was younger,
No order of court was obtained appointing a guardian of the
minors, or directing the sale of the real estate in question. The
purchase was made by "the defendant at the urgent solicitation of
Rebecca Barton, and upon her representation that she could not
otherwise maintain, educate and clothe her children. It does not
appear but that the price paid was the full value of the land at the
time of the purchase. The purchase-price was paid to Rebecca
Barton. The plaintiff lived with her mother until her marriage,
in September 1877. The plaintiff was born in March 1858 or
1859. This action was commenced on the 14th of November
1880, when the plaintiff was either twenty-one years and eight
months, or twenty-two years and eight months of age. She
assigns as the reason why she did not commence the action sooner,
that she was advised by her neighbors and her mother that she
could not bring the action until her brother, who is still a minor,
became of age. It does not appear that she applied for or received
legal advice upon the subject. She commenced the action about
three months after she was advised by one McCoid that she could
do so.
1. It is insisted that the plaintiff's deed was without consideration, and is, therefore, void. The consideration was paid to the
plaintiff's mother, and it is not shown to have been inadequate.
The plaintiff resided with her mother until her marriage, and it
does not appear but that she received the full benefit of the consideration in her support and education. The rule respecting the
contract of an infant is as follows: "That when the court can pronounce the contract to be to the infant's prejudice, it is void, and
when to his benefit, as for necessaries, it is good; and when the
contract is of an uncertain nature, as to benefit or prejudice, it is
voidable only at the election of the infant :" Keane v. Boycott, 2
H. Bl. 511; 2 Kent. Com. 193; Wheaton v. Bast, 5 Y6rg. 41.
The case of Swafford v. Ferguson, 31 Am. Rep. 639, s. c. 3
Lea 292, cited and relied upon by appellant, is one in which there
was no consideration whatever for the conveyance of the infant.
The conveyance in this case, in our opinion, was not void, but
voidable at the election of the plaintiff within a reasonable time
after attaining majority. See Code, sect. 2238.
2. The only Act of disaffirmance which the plaintiff did in the
case was the commencement of this suit, which was either four
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years and eight months or three years and eight months, after she
attained her majority. In Wright v. Germain, 21 Iowa 585, it
was held that an act of disaffirmance about two years after the plaintiff attained majority was too late, although during the last year
of that time he had been in the military service of the United
States. In Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa 466, it was held that an act
of disaffirmance about six months after attaining majority, was
not, under the circumstances, within a reasonable time. What is
a reasonable time within the meaning of the statute, depends upon
the circumstances of each case: Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Iowa 195.
In this case the only excuse offered for the great delay is that
the plaintiff was informed by her mother and neighbors that she
could not disaffirm the pontract until her brother became of age.
She, however, did not take legal advice, and she waited at least
three months after she was. informed that she could disaffirm the
contract before she commenced the action.
In our opinion the plaintiff's act of disaffirmance was not within
a reasonable time. The judgment is affirmed.
There has been comparatively little
legislation in this country respecting the
disability of infants to enter into contracts, and there is great confusion and
conflict among the authorities upon the
subject. Section 2238 of the Code of
Iowa, referred to by the court in the
principal case, is as follows : "A minor
is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by his other contracts,
unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time after he attains his majority,
and restores to the other party all money
or property received by him by virtue
of the contract and remaining within
his control at any time after attaining
his majority."
In England, on the other hand, by
the statute of 37 and 38 Vict. e. 62, all
contracts thenceforth entered into by
infants, and which, but for the statute,
would have been held voidable, are made
absolutely void and incapable of ratification upon arriving at majority. In
some of the United States, also, contracts entered into by infants cannot be
VOL. XXI.-35

enforced unless there has been a written
ratification after attaining majority. See
Thurlow v. Gilaore, 40 Ale. 378 ; stat.
of Maine 1845, c. 166; Stern v. Ferman, 4 Met. (Ky.) 309; Booney v.
Reardin, 6 Bush 34, 40, holding that
the statute does not apply to contracts
for necessaries.
The purpose of the above quoted section of the Iowa statute is to fix the
limit of the duration, and not to prescribe the time of the commencement of
the period within which a minor may disaffirm his contract. It is accordingly
held that before the lapse of a reasonable time after majority, the contract of
a minor may be disaffirmed by him,
whether the disaffirmance takes place
before or after majority: Childs v. Dobbins, 55 Iowa 205.
At the common law the rules as to when
an infant may disaffirm his contracts, appears to be that "all executory contracts,
which are voidable on the ground of infancy, may be avoided during infancy by
the infant as well as afterwards ; as when
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a minor promises to pay, &c. So, too,
all contracts respecting property which
are executed by delivery of some article,
on payment of money, may be rescinded
by the minor both before and after the
time of his coming of age. But the
conveyance of real property by feoffment
on delivery of the deed which comes in
lieu of payment, or by any other conveyance of such property, in fee, for life
or years, cannot be avoided before the
infant attains to full age."
See, generally, Reeves Dom. Rel., *254; Tyler
on Inf. and Cov, ch. iv. p. 69,
30;
Stafford v. Roof, 9 Coiv. 626; Ewell's
Lead. Cas. 92, 96; Riley v. M-allory,
33 Conn. 207 ; Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N.
Y. 407; Cogley v. Cushman, 16 Minn.
401 ; Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794;
Ewell's Lead. Cas. 3. See, however,
Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich. 182; Boody
v. McKenney, 23 Me. 525.
As to how soon after attaining majority the infant must exercise his privilege of disaffirming his voidable deeds
of land, &c., the authorities are not
agreed. One class of cases hold that he
must avoid his deed, if at all, within a
reasonable time after attaining majority,
which is the same rule as is established
by the above quoted statute in Iowa as
to all contracts of infants. See Hartman v. Kendall, 4 Ind. 403; Kline v.
Beebe, 6 Conn. 506; Bigelow v. Kinney,
3 Vt. 359 ; Richardson v. Boright, 9 Id.
368; Scott v. Buchanan, 11 Humpl.
476; Hastings v. Dollaride, 24 Cal.
216; Wallace v. Lewis, 4 Harr. 80;
Harrisv. Cannon, 6 Ga. 388. The same
rule has also been applied in some cases
to other transactions. See Bish. on Cont.,
276; Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 412,
a chattel mortgage; Robinson v. Weeks,
56 Me. 106, an action to recover back
money paid for stock: Little v. Duncan,
9 Rich. Law 59; Summers v. Wilson, 2
Cald. 469. The English cases, also,
seem to lay down the rule that the infant is bound expressly to repudiate his
contracts within a reasonable time after

arriving at majority, and that if he"
neglect so to do his silence will amount
to an affirmance: Dublin, etc., Railway
Co. v. Black, 16 Bng. L. & Eq. 556
and note; 22 L. J. (N. S.) Ex. 94;
8 Exch. 181; Rolmes v. Blogg, 8
Taunt. 35 ; s. c. 1 Moore 466; lorth
Western Railway v. .cMichael, 5 Ex.
114; Leeds, etc., Railway v. Fearnley,
4 Ex. 26; Cork, etc., Railway Co. v.
Cazenove, 10 Q. B. 935. The more
reasonable opinion, and that supported
by the weight of authority, seems to be
that in the case of deeds of land execnted by infants, mere acquiescence short
of the period of limitation, and not accompanieJf by circumstances rendering
it inequitable to adopt the rule in question, and manifesting a clear intention
to be bound by the conveyance, will not
operate as an affirkhance of such deed:
Whart. on Cont., 60 ; Prout v. Wiley,
28 Mich. 167 ; Drake v. Ramsey, 5
Ohio 251 ; Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Id.
193; Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 627 ;
Voories v. Voorhiss, 24 Barb. 153;
Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70;
Ruth v. Dock Co., 56 Mo. 206 ; Urban
v. Grimes, 2 Grant's Cas. 96; Tucker
v. Mloreland, 10 Pet. 76 ; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 523; Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539 ; Petersonv. Laik,
24 Mio. 544; Baker v. Kennett, 54 Id.
90. And with respect to other voidable
contracts, also, it seems that some act is
necessary on the infant's part tending to
show an intention to ratify, or he will
not be bound, and that a mere neglect to
disaffirm within a reasonable time is
not, without more, a ratification. See
note to Dublin, etc., Railway Co.' v.
Black, 16 Eng. L. & Eq. 556-558 ;
Ewell's Lead. Cas. 173; 1 Whart. on
Cont., 60.
The first branch of the principal case
approving the rule laid down in Keane
v. Boycott that "where the court can
pronounce the contract to be to the infant's prejudice, it is void, and when
to his benefit, as for necessaries, it is
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good," &c., does not seem to the writer

note to Fetrow v. Wisenan, Ewell's

to be supported by the -weight of authority; but, inasmuch as a discussion
of the question at this time would consume too much space, the subject is dismissed with a simple reference to the

Lead. Cases 30-34, where the authorities will be found collected and discussed.
LansHALL D. EWELL.

Circuit Court of the United States, -Districtof Bhode Island.
TURNER v. MERIDAN FIRE INS. C0.
An insurance policy, containing a provision that it shall be void in case the
insured shall make other insurance without the consent,of the company, is avoided
by a subsequent insurance without consent, even though the second policy is itself
avoided by a similar provision.
T. insured his property, the policy containing a provision that it should be void
in case the insured should make other insurance without the written consent of the
company; subsequently T. insured in another company, taking a policy with a similar provision. Neither company had notice of the insurance by the other. The
property was destroyed by fire. The company which issued the second policy denied
all liability, but paid $200 in settlement. Suit was then brought on the first policy.
Held, that plaintiff could not recover.

THIS was a motion for a new trial.

The facts were as follows.

On July 9th 1879, the defendant issued a policy of insurance
to the plaintiff, running for five years. Afterwards, on November
15th 1880, the plaintiff took out another policy for five years, covering the same property, in the Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The property was destroyed by fire March 8th

1881.
Both policies contained a provision that they should be void in
case the insured "shall have or shall hereafter make any other insurance on the property" without the written consent of the company. No notice was given of other insurance to either company,
nor was the fact discovered until after the fire.

The Springfield company, on learning that the plaintiff had
another policy in the defendant company, declined to pay the loss.
Afterwards, in October 1881, the Springfield policy was surrendered
and cancelled on payment of $200 to the plaintiff.

The company,

however, always denied any legal liability.
The defendant also refused payment of its policy, on the ground
of subsequent insurance in the Springfield company, and false
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swearing in relation thereto in the proofs of loss. This suit was
brought in February 1882, in the Rhode Island State Court, and
afterwards, removed to the United States Circuit Court. The
case was heard by the court, jury trial having been waived. And
the court being of opinion that the first policy was not avoided
gave judgment for plaintiff. Defendant moved for a new trial and
the motion was heard before LOWELL and COLT, JJ.
Stephen .Essex, for plaintiff.
Oscar Loapham, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLT, J.-The main question to be determined upon this motion,
is whether the defendant company can hold its policy to be invalid,
by reason of the subsequent policy taken out in the Springfield
company.
What constitutes other insurance, within the meaning of this
condition in insurance policies, is a question upon which courts have
widely differed.
The doctrine laid down by the highest tribunals of Massachusetts and some other states, is that the subsequent insurance being
invalid, at the time of loss, by reason of the breach of condition
therein, the prior insurance is good, even though the second company waive the forfeiture, and pay its policy in full. Thomas
v. Builders' Ins. Co., 119 Mass. 121; Jackson v. Massachusetts Fire Ins. Go., 23 Pick. 418; Clark v. New .-Evgland
Tire Ins. Cd., 6 Cush. 342; Hardy v. Union Ins. Co., 4
Allen 217; Lindley v. Union Ins. Co., 65 Me. 368; Philbrook
v. New -England-FireIns. Go., 37 Id. 137; Gee v. Cheshire
County ins. Co., 55 N. H. 65; Gale v. Ini. Co., 41 Id. 170;
Schenck v. Mercer County Ins. Co., 4 Zabr. 447; Jersey City
Ins. Co. v. Nichol, Am. L. Reg. Sept. 1882, p. 620 (35 N. J. Eq.)
291; Stacey v. -ranklin Ins. Co., 2 W. & S. 506; Sutherland
v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 8 Ins. L. J. 181 (Va. Ct. of
Appeals); Insurance Co. v. Holt, 35 Ohio Si 189; Knight v.
.EurekaIns. Go., 26 Id. 664; Rising Sun Ins. Co. v. Slaughter,
20 Ind. 520; Allison v. Phcenix Ins. Co., 3 Dil. 480.
On the contrary it is held, elsewhere, that a subsequent policy,
whether legally enforceable or not, or whether voidable on its face,
or voidable for extrinsic matter, works a, forfeiture of the prior
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policy. Somerfield v Ins. Co., 8 Lea 547; Funke v. Minnesota
Farmers' Ins. Asso., 15 Reporter 114; Suggs v. -Liverpool,
London and Globe Ins. Co., 9 Ins. L. J. 657 (Ky. Ct. of Appeals); Allen v. 3ferchants' Ins. Go., 30 La. An. 1386; Lackey
v. Georgia Bome Ins. Co., 42 Geo. 456; Bigler v. IV. Y. Central Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 402; Landers v. Watertown Ins. Co., 86
N. Y. 414; Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16
Peters 495; Jacobs v. -Equitable ITns. Co., 19 U. 0. Q. B. 250;
Ramsey v. Ins. Co., 11 U. 0. Q. B. 516; Mason v. Ins. Co.,
37 U. C. 0. P. 47; Royal Ins. Co. v. IitcCrea, Maury & Co., 8
Co., 8 Lea
Lea 531; -Equitable Ins. Co. v. Hle Crea, Maury
541.
There is still another view taken by the Supreme Court of Iowa,
in the case of Hubbard v. Haxtford .PireIns. Co., 33 Iowa 325,
to the effect that the question of recovery under the prior policy
turns upon whether the subsequent policy has been in fact avoided.
If the subsequent policy is recognised by the company issuing it
as a vrdid policy, any breach of condition being waived, this makes
it a valid insurance, and constitutes it a good defence to an action
upon the prior policy; but if the subsequent policy has been
avoided by the company, there is no other insurance, so as to defqat a recovery on the prior policy.
Although at first this reasoning may strike the mind as a fair
compromise between the other conflicting positions taken upon this
quesdon, it is subject to such grave objections that it cannot be
considered tenable.
If the condition in the first policy was violated, it was done at
the time the 'second contract of insurance was entered into, and
the subsequent affirmance or disaffirmance of the second contract,
should not affect the validity of the first. The validity of the
first contract can hardly turn upon what a stranger to it may do
with reference to another contract, even after liability upon the
first contract has become absolule by a destruction of the property:
Funke v. Minnesota Parmers'Insurance Asso., supra.
At the trial of the cause, it seemed as if the )yeight of authority
was in favor of holding the prior policy good, upon the ground
that the subsequent policy was invalid, and this position had been
held by Judge DILLON, in Allison v. i'kenix Ins. Co., 3 Dil. 480,
not to be in conflict with the real point in judgment in Carpenter
v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Peters 495, but upon fur'-
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ther consideration of all the authorities, and the principles which
govern them, we cannot adopt this view.
This construction is open to the objection, that the insured may
collect both policies. It is also subject to the criticism that in decid.
ing upon the validity of one contract, the court, in the same action,
must go outside of it, and determine, first, the validity of one or
more independent contracts, involving, perhaps, an inquiry into
complicated questions of fact respecting those contracts: Boyal
Ins. Co. v. XieCrea, 3,Maury & C'o., 8 Lea 531.
But further than this the principle upon which this construction
is founded does not appear to be satisfactory. The reasoning in
these cases is based largely on the assumption that the second
policy is void by reason of the breach of condition therein, and that
the issuing of such a void policy is no violation of the condition
as to other insurance in the first policy. But is not this assumption too broad ? Is it legally true that the second policy is a void
-contract ? Conditions of this character in insurance policies are
inserted for the benefit of the insurer, and their violation does not
render the policy void, but only voidable at the election of the
insurer. It is still a binding contract upon the insured. He can
take no advantage of this breach of condition, and the insurer
could still enforce the contract against him if .anything was to be
gained by so doing.
"Although the policy by its terms provides that it shall be void
on a breach of any of its conditions, its legal effect is simply to
render it voidable at the election of the insurer, and that the
insurer can waive the forfeiture and continue the policy in force;
or to state the proposition more broadly, in all contracts where the
stipulations avoiding the same are inserted for the sole benefit of
one of the parties, the word void is to be construed as though the
contract read voidable. This view seems to be sound in principle,
just in practice, and is certainly well sustained by authority :"
Masonic Mitt. Benefit Society v. Beck, Sup. Ot. of Indiana, 11
Ins. L. J., Oct. 1882, 755; Armstrong v. Turquand, 9 Irish C.
L. 32; s. c. 3 Life and Acc. R. 350.
The party in default cannot defeat the contract: Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 70. The policy is merely voidable and
may be avoided by the underwriters upon due proof of facts, but
until so avoided it must be treated for all practical purposes as a
subsisting policy: Carpenter v. Providence Washington Its. Co.,
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16 Peters 495. See also Baer v. Phcenix Ins. Co., 4 Bush 242,
and authorities before cited.
The doctrine of waiver as applied to conditions in policies of
insurance and which is invoked so frequently, is founded in part at
least upon the theory that breach of condition only renders the
policy voidable. The same principle prevails as to conditions in
leases where the term void is used. The lease becomes void only
by the lessor's electing to trust it so, and not by the mere happening of the breach, and mpdern decisions have quite exploded the
old distinction in this respect between leases for years and for life:
Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa 70 note; Taylor's Land. &
Ten., sect. 492.
As the second policy is not a void contract, but only voidable at
the election of the company, as it is a contract entered into by the
insured, and which he cannot dispute, and as the reason, if any,
why he cannot legally enforce it arises from his own neglect or
misrepresentation, may it not be fairly claimed that this is other
insurance within the meaning and intent of the condition in the
first policy ? We think the rule, supported as it is by authorities
of great weight, which holds the taking out of a voidable policy a
violation of the provision respecting other insurance in the first
policy, the best one, and subject to less serious objections than any
other.
,What was the position of this plaintiff at the time of the loss?
He had one policy of insurance in the defendant company, and he
had another policy of later date in the Springfield company. This
second policy was issued in good faith by the Springfield company
and the premium paid. It was a policy the validity of which the
plaintiff could not deny, and upon which he obtained $200 by way
of compromise. It seems to us that upon any fair rule of'interpretation this must be considered a breach of the condition as to other
insurance in the defendant's policy.
We cannot bring our minds to assent to the proposition that a
subsequent contract- of insurance binding upon the assured, and
which the company may pay in full or in part, is no violation of the
terms of the first policy.
We believe the general rule, that conditions in insurance policies
inserted for the benefit of the company should be strictly construed
against it, to be a sound one, and we do not think our conclusion in
this case inconsistent with this doctrine; at the same time we should

